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We define (in 93) the concept of a differential game with a finite duration T 
for the system (l.l), (1.2) with payoff (1.7); y  = y(t) and z = z(t) are the 
control functions of the players y  and x. The definition is given in terms of a 
sequence of approximating deterministic games, constructed in 92. In casef 
has the form (I .5) and h has the form (1 .S) we prove (in $3) that the game has 
Value. If  f  does not have the form (1.5) (i.e., if y  and z do not appear 
“separated” in f) then the game may not have Value; an example to this 
effect is given in 97. 
In 94 it is proved that the Value is independent of the particular choice of 
the approximating sequence of games. It is also shown that the Value is 
Lipschitz continuous in the initial conditions. 
In 95 it is proved, under an additional convexity condition onf, that there 
exists a saddle point. 
In 96 we consider pursuit-evasion games and prove that the game has 
“extended” Value. A saddle point does not exist in general, even under 
convexity conditions. 
Our work generalizes a recent paper of Varaiya and Lin [8]. In $8 we shall 
discuss their work in relation to ours. We shall also say a few words about the 
approach of Fleming [3], [d], [5] to the subject. 
In $9 we consider differential games with delayed information and prove 
the existence of Value. The value converges to the value of the corresponding 
game with no delay, as the size of the delay goes to zero. 
* This work was partially supported by National Science Foundation grant NSF 
GP-5558. 
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1. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS AND ASSKJMPTIOIXS 
Consider a system of m ordinary differential equations 
in an interval t, < t < T, where 0 < t, < T < co, and an initial condition 
x(&J = xg . (1.2) 
Let Y and 2 be fixed compact subsets of euclidean space Rp and Rq 
respectively. We assume: 
(i) f(t, X, y, z) is continuous in (t, x, y, z) E [0, T] x Rm x Y x 2. 
(ii) ForeachtE[O,T],yEY,z~Zandx,%inR~with]xI <R,laj <R, 
lf(4 X>Y, 4 -f(t, g, Y, 4 G 4 I x - g I 
(iii) For each t E [0, T], y  E Y, x E 2, x E R”, 
(K, constant). (1.3) 
lf(4 x, y, 4 < k, I x I + k, (k, , K, constants). (1.4) 
Actually, all the results of this paper remain true under somewhat weaker 
continuity assumptions on f  ; the k, may also be taken to depend on t, provided 
they belong to L1(O, T). 
Measurable functions y(t) (z(t)) satisfying y(t) E Y (z(t) E 2) for almost all 
t will be called control functions of y  (of x). 
As is well known (see, for instance, [2]), if (i)-(iii) hold, then for any pair 
of control functions y(t), z(t) in [to, T] there exists a unique solution x(t) of 
(1. I), (1.2) in [to , T]. x(t) is a solution of (1 .l) in the following sense: It is 
absolutely continuous, and (1.1) holds for almost all t E [t,, , 7’1. We call x(r) 
the trajectory corresponding to the controls y(t) and z(t). We note that all the 
results of this paper remain true if (I .4) is replaced by any other condition 
which ensures that for any ‘i E (tO , T), the solutions of (l.l), (1.2) in [f,, , T) 
are bounded, uniformly, by a constant independent of 7. 
In the games which we consider below, one player (called y) controls the 
function y(t) and another player (called z) controls the function z(t). 
We shall need the following hy-pothesis: 
(iv) y  and x act “separately” on the right-hand side of (l.l), i.e., 
.f(t, x, y, z> == fl(L x, y) +f”(t, LX, x). (1.5) 
We are given a payofffunctional ~(x, y, z) which depends on the controls 
y(t), x(t) and on the corresponding trajectory x(t), for t, < t < T. Since x(t) 
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is already determined by the controls y(t), z(t), we can write the payoff in the 
form 
cL(%Y, 4 = P(Y, 4. (1.6) 
The player y tries to maximize the payoff P, whereas the player z tries to 
minimize the payoff P. 
The actual form of P(y, x) that we consider here is 
(1.7) 
where pt; is a real-valued functional on the trajectories x(t) and k is a real- 
valued function of (t, x, y, Z) in [0, T] x Rm x Y x 2. 
Denote by C[t, , T] the Banach space of complex-valued continuous 
functions x(t) on [to, T] with the norm ~up~,-,~<r 1 x(t)]. Denote by [C[t, , T]]” 
the product of m spaces C[t, , T]. Denote by XtO,T the subset of [C[t, , T]]” 
consisting of all the trajectories x(t) of (1 .l), (1.2). We shall assume: 
(v) Pi, is a uniformly continuous functional on the subset Xt,,r of 
[C[t, , T]]“, and k(t, x, y, x) is a continuous function on [to, T] x R” x Y x Z. 
(vi) y and z act “separately” on the integral part of the payoff, i.e., 
k(t, x, Y, 4 = h(t, x, Y) + k,(t, x, 4 (1.8) 
Our object is to define a differential game played by y and z and to prove 
that it has Value and saddle points. The situation here is entirely different 
from that encountered in discrete games. In the latter, there is a finite number 
of turns, and both players play each turn “at the same time.” The concept of 
“elementary distribution” then enters. For the present situation, however, 
time is continuous and the concept “at the same time” becomes vague. 
In order to clarify this concept and to prove that the resulting game has 
Value we resort to two sequences of approximating games: one consisting 
of upper &games GS and the other consisting of lower S-games G, . 
2. UPPER AND LOWER &GAMES 
Throughout this section we assume that (i)-(iii) hold. 
Let Y  be any positive integer and set 6 = (T - Q/2’, n = 2’. We introduce 
the intervals 
Ij = {t; t, + (j - 1) 6 < t < to +is> (1 Gj<n), 
and denote by Yj (ZJ the set of all measurable functions on Ii whose values 
belong to Y(Z) for almost all t. 
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Let Y*J be any map from 2, x *.. x .Zj into I’, . 1Ve call the vector 
P = (PI,..., ry 
an upper 6-strategy for the player y. Similarly, the vector 
A” = (A6J,..., AB*fl), 
where ds*j is any map from Y-l x ... x Yj into Zj, is called an r*pper 
a-strategy for the player x. 
Let r,,, (j > 2) be any map from Y1 x 2, x Z, x *.. x Zjel into Y, . 
It is convenient to denote by r,,, any function in Y1 . The vector 
4 = (r,,, ,..., r,,,) 
is called a lower a-strategy ror y.’ Finally, let A,,j (j > 2) be any map from 
z, x Yl x *a* x Yjwl into Zj and let As,l denote any function in 2, . The 
vector 
A, = (A,,, ,..., A,,,) 
is then called a lower &strategy for z. 
DEFINITION OF UPPER ~-GAMES G”. Take any upper a-strategy rs for y, 
and any lower &strategy A, for x. Player z begins by choosing z, = A,,, on1, . 
Player y  reacts by choosing y1 = = Ys,lz, on II . 
In general, after z makes a choice xj = A&x1 ,yl ,yz ,..., yj-J on 1,) y  
chooses yi = rsJ( n “1 ,‘..> zj) on Z, . 
We denote the above scheme by G6 and call it an upper a-game. We denote 
the corresponding controls byyb(t) and z,(t), and the corresponding trajectory 
by P(t). We write the corresponding payoff in the form 
P( y”, zg) E P[A, ) rs] =: P[A,,, ) w,..., A,,, ) ry (2.1) 
The upper S-value P’ of the game G6 is defined by 
Vv” = inf sup ... inf sup P[A6,1 , PJ ,.,., A,,, , Pn]. (2.2) 
As.1 pxl AL?.?& $,n 
Let Q be a real-valued function defined on a set r x wand let s vary in the 
set S of all maps from V into W. Then, as is easily verified, 
inf sup Q(v, s(v)) = inf sup Q(v, w) = sup inf Q(z), s(o)). 
oev ses aev WEW St-S VEV 
(2.3) 
1 In our original version, T,,, (j -’ 2) was defined as any map from Z1 x ... x Zj-, 
into Y, . J. Serrin suggested that T,,, should depend also on the y-control on I, (note 
that T,,$ need not depend explicitly on T,,, ,..., T,,jm, since these maps are already 
given functions of the control of z on I, for i -.I j - 1). His suggestion seems reason- 
able, although the results of this paper are the same for either one of the two de- 
finitions. 
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Applying this to -Q instead of Q, we get 
sup inf Q(u, S(V)) = sup inf Q(z), zu) = inf sup Q(v, S(V)). 
oev ses VGV wcw SES OEV 
(2.4) 
LEMMA 1. Let (i)-(iii) hold. Then 
V8 = inf sup P[ll, , P] = sup inf P[Ads, P], (2.5) 
AS i-6 rs Aa 
where 
sup = sup .*. sup, inf =. nf ..* inf. 
l-8 ra,l r&n A8 A&l A&n 
Proof. The first equality in (2.5) is obtained by a successive application of 
(2.4). The second equality in (2.5) follows by a successive application of (2.3). 
We now define lower &games G, analogously to the definition of G”. Thus, 
y  begins by choosing y1 = l?,,, on Y1 . Then z reacts with a choice 
z1 = dssly, on I1 . In general, y  makes a choice yj = rs,j(yl , x1 , xp ,..., xjJ 
on lj, and then z makes a choice zj = ds*j(y, ,..., yi) on Ij. Denote 
the controls obtained in this way by ys(t) and zs(t), and let x,(t) denote the 
corresponding trajectory. We write 
P(Y* 3 4 = WC3 , AS] = P[Y,,, ) AS.1 )...) I-**, ) LP]. (2.6) 
We define the lower a-value V, of the game G, by 
V, = sup inf a.. sup inf P[r,,, , Ass1 ,..., I’,., , As*n]. 
i-S.1 AS,’ r8.n A&” 
(2.7) 
Analogously to Lemma 1, we have: 
LEMMA 2. Let (i)-(iii) hold. Then 
where 
V, = sup inn P[I’, , As] = inf SUP P[r, , A*], 
l-8 A6 r8 
sup = sup ... sup, inf = inf ..* inf. 
l-6 r8.1 r8,% AS AS.1 A&n 
v3) 
From the definition of V6, V, one easily gets: 
LEMMA 3. Let (i)-(iii) hold and let ai = (T - Q/2’< (i = 1, 2), 6, < 6,. 
Then 
v*2 3 v61 > val 2 vsz . (2.9) 
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V+ = lim V*, 
8-+0 
v- = iii vs (6 = 27, Y = 1, 2 )... )* (2.10) 
Lemma 3 implies that these limits exist and that V+ > V-. 
3. EXISTENCE OF VALUE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 
DEFINITIONS. The dijfeerentiul game associated with the system (1. l), (1.2) 
and with the payoff (1.7) is the pair of sequences G = ((G6}, {G6}). The 
number V+ defined in (2. IO) 1s called the upper oalue of the game G. Similarly, 
V- is called the lower value of the game G. If  6:-m :z: V- then we say that the 
game has VaZue. The value of the Value is 
v  = v+ = v-. (3.1) 
THEOREM 1. Let the assumptions (i)-(vi) hold. Then the dzperential game 
G associated with (I.]), (1.2), (1.7) has Value. 
Proof. In view of Lemma 3, it suffices to show that for any E > 0, 
V8 - v, < 3E (3.2) 
for an infinite sequence of 6’s. Now, Lemma I implies that for any 6 there 
exists an upper a-strategy 
pa = p.1,..,, pq 
for y, such that 
V8 < P[d, ) F”] + E for all A, . (3.3) 
Similarly, there exists an upper a-strategy 
28 = (J&l ,..., &) 
for z such that 
v&P[r*,B] --E for all r, . (3.4) 
Fix a point z in Z and consider the following game of G”: z chooses z1 = z 
on I1 . Then y  chooses yr = F%zr on 1r . In general, 
q(t) = m-y y1 ).,.) yjAl)(t - 6) for tEIj, 
yi(t) = Pj(Zl )...) zi)(t) (3.5) for tEIj* 
Denote by y*(t), z,(t) the control functions thus defined, and by x*(t) the 
corresponding trajectory. We can write 
o^,,, = Xl , zj = &i(q , y1 ,..., y3-d (2 < j d n> 
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where 
is a lower a-strategy for z. Then (3.3) gives 
V6 < P[A, ) P] + 6. (3.6) 
We shall compare the above game of G” with the following game of G, : 
First y chooses the control yr on 1, as before. Then z chooses z, = J8r1y1 on 
I1 . In general, 
y chooses yj on Ii as in (3.Q 
z chooses zj = o”G*j( yr ,..., yJ on Ij . 
(3.7) 
Denote the control of z thus defined by zs(t) and the corresponding 
trajectory by x8(t). The control function for y is the same function y”(t) as 
before. We can write 
f&l = Yl ) Yj = fS,j(Yl Y z1 T*..T zj-l) (2 <j < n, 
where 
J-i = @+S,l 7*.., I?,,,,> 
is a lower a-strategy for y. Then (3.4) gives 
From the definition of zs(t), x,(t) we see that 
z”(t) = z,(t - 6) for t, + 6 < t < T. (3.9) 
We shall need the following lemma. 
LEMMA 4. Assume that (i)-(iv) hold and let k,(t, x,y), k,(t, x, 2) be 
continuous functions in [to , T] x Rnl x Y and [t, , T] x R” x Z, respectively. 
Let yh(t), z,,(t) be any control functions for y, z respectively, for each h in a 
sequence {A,}; h, L 0 if n 7 cg. Let ,2,,(t) be any control function satisfying 
SA(t) = zh(t - X) fey t, + X :.z t < T, X E (h,). Denote by x,+(t) and SA(t) the 
trajectories corresponding to y,,(t), zA(t) and to m(t), 2*(t) respectively. Then 
there exists a subsequence {An,} such that, if X = /ln, + 0, then 
(3.10) 
j-l h(t, Ut>, yxtt)) dt - 1’ k,(t, 4% x(t)> dt -+ 0, 
to to 
(3.11) 
j-’ h(t, %(t), WN dt - I“ kz(t, 44, WN dt - 0. 
to to 
(3.12) 
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Proof. Set I = 1 sA(t) - xn(t)j. From the assumptions (ii), (iv) we have 
(3.13) 
The family {x,+,(t)} is equicontinuous and uniformly bounded. Hence, by the 
lemma of Ascoli-Arzela, there exists a subsequence {h,,} such that {x,,,,(t)} is 
uniformly convergent to some function x(t). From the continuity off2(t, X, z) 
we conclude that 
J’ 1, lf2b, 44 44 -f2(~, W, W)l dT G ~(4 
(3.14) 
where y(h,,) is independent of t and of the controls X(T), and y(h,,) -+ 0 if 
h n’ + 0. 
Since a,,(T) = ~~(7 - h), we have, using the continuity off 2, 
lj;of2(T, %(T), %(T)) dT - jlo+,f2(T - A, X(T - A), zdT - A)) dT / G &(A) 
(3.15) 
where S(h,) is independent of t, and 6(&J + 0 if X, -+ 0. 
Using (3.14), (3.15) in (3.13) we find 
‘h(t) < k, j:, Q(T) dT t 34) + a(h) + CA (C constant). 
From this inequality one clearly obtains: 
SUP rldd - 0 
to<t<T 
if h = A,, --t 0. 
This completes the proof of (3.10). (3.11) follows immediately from (3.10). 
To prove (3.12), we use the relations 
sup 1 kgt) - x(t)1 ---• 0, sup 1 aA - x(t)1 --f 0 
t,<t<T t CtCT 
0 
for h = &,, -+ 0. It follows that it suffices to show that 
1’ k,(t, x(t), S,(t)) dt - jr k,(t, x(t), q(t)) dt ---f 0 
* 10 ‘0 
as X = h,, --z 0. This however follows easily upon making use of (3.15) with 
f” = k,. 
Using (3.9) and the assumptions (v), (vi), we can apply Lemma 4, and 
conclude that 
~P[&~q-P[~Jq <E (3.16) 
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if 6 E (Sj) where Sj is a suitable subsequence of 6’s. Combining (3.6), (3.8) 
with (3.16), the assertion (3.2) follows. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
4. PROPERTIES OF THE VALUE 
Let n be any partition t, < t, < t, < .*. < t, = T of [to , T]. Denote by 
lj the interval tjel < t < tj . Let Yj (2,) denote the set of all measurable 
functions y(t) (z(t)) on Ij with values in Y (2) for almost all t. We define an 
upper n-strategy P for the player y  as a vector 
r- = (I-J,..., P,“) 
where P-j is a map from Z, x a.* x Z, into Yj . Similarly we define an 
upper r-strategy dm for z. 
A lower x-strategy for the player z is a vector 
where d,,j (forj > 2) is a map from 2, x Yr x Y, x *.* x YPdl into Zj , 
and A,,, is any element of Z, . Similarly we define a lower n-strategy r, for y. 
An upper n-game G- is defined similarly to G6. The upper x-value Vn of Gn 
is defined by 
V’” = inf sup ..+ inf sup PIA,,l , PJ ,..., A,,, , P*“] 
A 77.1 FJ A n.n 
p,n 
where P[-**I is the payoff. Setting 
(4.1) 
P[An , rq = P[A,>, ) ml ,..., A,,, , ry 
we then have (cf. Lemma 1): 
V- = inf sup P[Av , P] = SU; “f P[A,, , P]. (4.2) 
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Similarly we define a lower n-game G, . The lower n-value VW is defined by 
V, = sup inf ..a SUP inf P[m,r , AnJ ,..., rm,, , Anq. (4.3) 
r 7r.l AT,1 r 7r,n A”.?? 
We have: 
V, = sup inf P[r,, , An] = inf sup P[rm , An]. 
I-, An r” r 7I 
It is clear that 
(4.4) 
vn 3 v,. 
We denote by ( x ( the mesh of r, i.e., ! 7~ 1 = max(ti - tjpl). 
(4.5) 
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THEOREM 2. Assume that (i)-(vi) hold. Let {nk) 6 e a sequence of partitions of 
[t,,T]withi~gj’Oifh~a3. Then 
(4.6) 
Theorem 2 shows that the particular sequence of partitions used in the 
definition of a differential game is irrelevant. 
Proof. In view of (4.5) it suffices to show that for any l > 0, 
F-“” - v  “Is < 26 (4.7) 
if K is sufficiently large. 
From Theorem 1 it follows that we can choose an integer r sufficiently 
large such that if 8 = (T - Q/2’ then 
0 s; va - vs < E. (4.8) 
From now on 6 is fixed. 
We shall need the following lemma. 
LEMMA 5. Assume that (i)-(vi) hold. Let r be a partition 
t,, < fl < . . . < t, =.: T 
of [to , T], and let rr* be another partition obtained from r by introducing one 
additional point t*, ti < t* < tlTl . Then 
~ VW - VT* 1 < $1 T I) 
where I is a function independent of r, t*, and T(t) -* 0 if t --j 0. 
Proof. Denote by I+r,l (Ii,,,,) the interval ti < t < t* (i* < t < ti+l). 
Fork =: 1,2, denote by Yi, l,k (ZL+l,k) h t e se 0 control functions for y  (z) on t f  
Ii+l,k . We can then write any upper z--strategy P and any upper n*-strategy 
I’-* in the form 
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Similarly we can write 
where 
A,:Z, x Yl x .** X Yj-l+Zj (2 <j < n), 
4,l.l : 2, x Y, x *.* x Yi - z,+1,1, 
4+1,2 : z, x Yl x -*- x yi x yi+1,1 - zi,.I.2 , 
A+2 : z, x Yl x *-* x Y, x Yi+1,1 x Y,+1,2 --f zi+s 
bj : z, x Yl x -** x Yi x Y,+l,l x Y,+l,2 x T(i+2 x -** x Y&,-t zj 
(i + 3 <j < n). 
We can clearly identify the maps fij with the maps P for i + 2 -< j < n, 
and the maps dj with the maps A, for i f 3 < j < n. Consequently, 
Vn = inf SUP P[A, , r1 ,..., Ai , P, Ai+l , r+l, Ai+ , P+2 ,..., A,, , r’“] 
A c I-* 
VW* = inf SUP P[Ad, , rl,..., Ai , ri, Ai+l,l , ri+lJ, Ai+1,2, ri+1,2, Aitn , rif2, 
d7T* l-r* . ..) 4 3 m. 
We see that Vn differs from VT* only in that the “inf” and “sup” with 
respect to the controls y(t), z(t) in the interval ti < t < t,+l are taken over 
different sets. However, any two trajectories x(t) and s(t) whose controls y, 
z agree outside the interval ti < t < ti+l , satisfy: 
sup I 2(t) - x(t)1 < C(ti+r - tJ 
t <tiT 
0’ ’ 
where C is a constant independent of the controls. Using this and (1.7), we 
easily find that 
I v- - vv* I < Cdl 77 I + w(I7T I)) 
where C, and w(t) are indepedent of r, t*, and w(t) + 0 if t--z 0 (w depends 
on the moduli of continuity of pt, and of h(x, t, y, z) in x). This completes the 
proof of the lemma. 
Denote now by nTTk,i the partition obtained from nTTk by adding the points 
t, + jS for 1 <j < i. For i = 2’ - 1 we write rg,i = v~*. If we apply 
Lemma 5 to each pair T~,~., x~,~+~ (with nk.,O = nk) then we conclude that 
1 VT,* - v’“’ 1 < 2’41 rk 1). (4.9) 
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I L’,,x - vnh- I G 2% nL I). (4.10) 
Since the partition rrIc * is a refinement of the partition with tj 4, + $3 
0 <j < 2’, we have: 
v:” ‘, :; c’“k* 2 V 6-l --: v,,* . (4.11) 
Combining (4.8)-(4.10) we find that 
v  vrk 9 -’ P -- E - 2@7(] Xk 1). 
This implies (4.7) if k is sufficiently large. 
In the remaining part of this section we study the dependence of the Value 
on the initial conditions. We denote the game associated with (1. l), (1.2), (1.7) 
by G&q, , to), and its value by V(x, , t,,). 
We first consider the behaviour of L’(x,, , to) upon x,, . We shall assume: 
(vii) For any x, x in XfO,T, 
I f+,(4 - k&-V G k ,,“-“,&, i x(t) - X(0 ; (4.12) 
for any t E [0, T], y  E Y, z E Z, and x7, x’ in R”‘, 
( R(t, x,y, 2) - h(t, x’,y, z)’ c k I x - x’ I, (4.13) 
where k is a constant. 
THEOREM 3. Assume that (i)-(vii) hold. Then FY(xo , to) satisfies a uniform 
Lipschitz condition in x0 , i.e., 
I V(% 9 to) - c’(q , to); 6. c i x,, - x1 I. (4.14) 
Proof. Let x(t), x(t) be solutions of the same equation (1 .l) (where 
y  = y(t), z = x(t)), satisfying x(t,) = x,, , x(t(,) = x1 . From the standard 
theory of ordinary differential equations (see, for instance, [2]) we have: 
where C’ is a constant independent of the control functions. From the 
definition of Ifs we then get, upon using (4.12), (4.13), 
! JP(x, , to) - Vs(x, , to)1 S C i x0 - x1 1. 
Taking S - 0 and using Theorem 1, (4.14) follows. 
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We shall now consider the behavior of V(x, , to) also in to . We shall 
assume: 
(viii) For all t, t in [0, T], x E Rnz and y E Y, z E Z, 
If@> x> y, 4 -f(C x,y, 41 d k I t - f I, 
I h(t, %Y, 4 -f(C x,y, x)I d R I t - f I, 
where k is a constant. Furthermore, for all 0 < t, < T, 
pt,(x) = g(x(T)), g a Lipschitz continuous function. 
(4.15) 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
THEOREM 4. Assunze that (i)-(viii) hold. Then V(x, , t,) is unifoYmZy 
Lipschitz continuous in (x,, , to) E Rm x [0, T]. 
Proof. In view of Theorem 3, it remains to prove that 
I w% 7 to) - q% 3 h)l < c I to - t, I. (4.18) 
Denote by P, and PI the payoffs corresponding to t, and t, , respectively. 
Consider the map 
t+s=t,+T-to T--t, (t - t,). (4.19) 
It correspond in a natural way to any partition oft, < t < T a partition of 
t, < s < T and to any (upper or lower) S-strategy on [to, T] a S-strategy on 
[tl , T]. Thus the sets of P corresponding to the two different intervals 
[t,, , T] and [tl , T] are equivalent. The same holds for the sets of A, . Denote 
this correspondence briefly by I/J. Set also ($y)(s) = y(t), (#z)(s) = x(t). Thus, 
if y, .a correspond to (A, , P) then $y, #x correspond to (#A, , #P). 
In order to evaluate P(x ,, , t,) - V”(x, , tl) we have to compare each 
trajectory x(t) with the corresponding trajectory S(S) = (#x)(s) obtained by 
replacing y, z by I/J~, I@, and (1.2) by x(tl) = x0 . 
Using the transformation (4.19) in the differential equation for g(s) we find 
that %[t] E X(S) satisfies 
Using (4.15) and the standard estimates for ordinary differential equations, we 
find that 
ywT I z[tl - ml d Cd to - t, I (i = max(t, , tJ), (4.20) 
where C,, is a constant independent of the controls. 
82 FRIEDMAN 
Performing the transformation (4.19) also in the payoff and using (4.13), 
(4.16), (4.17) and (4.20), we get 
I PO(Y> 4 - ~kkY> @)I < C” It,, - t, I 
with a different constant C, . 
(4.21) 
From (4.21) and the paragraph following (4.19) it follows that 
I vxo 3 to) - V”(x, ) tl)j 5: c , to - t, 1. 
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
Remark. The assumption (4.17) is not essential. In fact, Theorem 4 clearly 
remains true if (4.17) is replaced by the more general conditions: Pi, is 
uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x (cf. (4.12)), and 
I k%,(x) - Pt,bw G 4 to - 4 I (4.22) 
where 4 is the correspondence defined by (4.19). 
5. EXISTEKCE OF SADDLE POINTS 
The results of $2, 3 contain all the ingredients necessary for establishing 
the existence of a saddle point for the differential game G. We need however 
one additional assumption to guarantee that X,,,T is a compact subset of 
[C[t,, , T]]“. Such an assumption is the following one: 
(ix) For each t E [0, 2’1, .v E Rwc, the sets fl(t, &Y, I’) and f2(t, x, Z) are 
convex. 
Indeed, if (ix) holds then (see [6]) XtO,T is compact. 
In view of Lemmas 1, 2, for any S there exist upper s-strategies 
r*” = (Ty,..., ry, A,* = (A;J..., A;“) 
such that, for any A,, r, , 
V” s: P[A, ) I‘,:61 + 6, (5.1) 
v, 2: P[Y, ) A.61 - 6. (5.2) 
Denote byy,a(t), 2*6(t) and “+8(t) the controls ofy, z and the corresponding 
trajectory obtained by playing according to (3.5) with fs, d8 replaced by 
r.+” and As* respectively. Since Xt,,T is compact, there exists a subsequence 
of 6’s, say {a,*}, and a trajectory x*(t), such that 
toFt%TI x*Yt) - x*(t)/ - 0 if 6 = sj*+o. (5.3) 
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From the proof of Theorem 1 we have: 
p(Y*6, zs*.) - v  as S+O. (5.4) 
Consider next any two sequences r = {P), d = {As). For each pair 
(P, ds) we play according to (3.5) with fs, 0” replaced by P, A”. Denote by 
yfi, xg , x6 the resulting y-control, z-control and trajectory. Let {S,} be any 
subsequence of (6) such that 
sup / z@(t) - X(t)1 - 0 if s=s,+o (5.5) 
t,<te 
for some trajectory a(t). Since XtO,r is compact, such a subsequence always 
exists. 
DEFINITION. Any trajectory x(t) obtained in the above manner is called 
an outcome of r, A with initial control Z. 
We denote by P&r, A] the set of all numbers 
lim P( y’j, zaj) 
6,+0 
(5.6) 
withy”, zg as above and (S?} such that (5.5) holds and the limit in (5.6) exists. 
DEFINITIOKS. The sequences I’, A are called strategies for y  and z 
respectively. The set P,[r, A] is called the payoff of the strategies I’, A (with 
initial control Z). 
From (5.4) we see that the set P,[P, d*] consists of just one number, 
namely I/. Thus, 
p$[r+, A*] = (V}. (5.7) 
NOTATION. Given sets A and B of real numbers, we write A < B if 
a < b for all a E A, b E B. If  A (B) consists of just one point a (b) then we also 
write a *< B (A < b). 
From (5.1) we obtain 
lii v* < qr*, A]. (5.8) 
Similarly, from (5.2) we get 
lii V, 2 I’,-[r, A*]. (5.9) 
Combining (5.7)-(5.9) we can write: 
P,[r, A*] < PJP*, A*] = (V} < P,[r*, A] (5.10) 
for all strategies r, d. 
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We now choose any point 7 in I7 and define the set Py_[r, A] analogously to 
Pz[r, A]. Thus, y  chooses y1 = J and, generally, 
y?(t) = r-1(x1 ) z, )...) X,-l)(t -- 6) for t E rj (2 G, j :I n), 
q(t) = A”,‘( y1 ,..., yj)(t) for t EI, (1 G-j < 72). 
(5. I 1) 
Denote by ys(t) and z”(t) the controls thus obtained for y  and z, respectively, 
and denote by x,(t) the corresponding trajectory. If  there exists a subsequence 
(Sj} of {S] such that 
I’+% P(Y6, 3 zS9) = P, (5.12) 
sup I q.(t) -- x(t)1 - 0 as t,<t<r 1 i- *, 
(5.13) 
where x(t) is a trajectory, then we say that x(t) is an outcome of r, A (with 
initial control 7) and write ,f3 E Py_[r, A]. The set PYII’, A], consisting of all 
such numbers p, is called thepayofiof the strategies r, A (with initial contyoly). 
I f  we take P = r*“, As = A,” then we find, using Lemma 4 (in a way 
similar to that used in the proof of Theorem 1) that Py[r*, A*] consists of 
just one point, the Value f? Furthermore, 
qr, A”] :. {V) -< fyi-, A] (5.14) 
for all strategies 7, A. 
Combining (5.14) with (5. IO), we conclude that 
pap-, A*] G pR[r*, A*] =:- iv> .:. p,p, AI, (5.15) 
where 01, /3, y  are any points in Z u E;. 
A pair (r*, A*) satisfying (5.15) is called a saddle point of the game. 
We sum up: 
THEOREM 5. Assume that (i)-(vi) and (ix) hold. Then there exists a saddle 
point of the dz#erentiaZgame G, i.e., a pair (r*, A*) such that (5.15) holds for 
any strategies r, A and for any OL, p, y in Z u Y. 
In proving Theorem 5 we have employed upper a-strategies. However, 
if we instead use only lower a-strategies, or lower h-strategies for one player 
and upper a-strategies for the other player, then we get the same result. This 
can be proved using Lemma 4. 
Remark. In the definition of a saddle point we have employed the concept 
of a strategy I’ based on a sequence of a-strategies corresponding to the 
sequence of partitions 
+, = t, , to + 6, 43 + s..., to + -y- ! 
*-to& f (r = 1, 2,...). 
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However one can define a strategy I’ based upon any other sequence (r7} of 
partitions, provided 1 v,. ( -+ 0 as r -+ co. Theorem 5 remains true, and the 
proof is the same. This remark is important, since there may occur instances 
where it is desirable to employ partitions 7~~ different from the +r . 
The above remark applies also to Theorem 6, in $6. 
6. PURSUIT-EVASION GAMES 
Let F be a non-empty closed set in the space {(x, t); x E A”, 0 < t < a}. 
If x(t) is a trajectory, and if x(t) E F but x(t) 4 F for t, < t < t, then we say 
that capture occurs at t = t. We assume that F contains the set R” x [T,, , co) 
for some t, < T, < T. This amounts to assuming that in the pursuit-evasion 
game to be considered below we are certain that capture will occur in a 
finite time < T, . Thus we may conceive the game as having a finite 
duration T, with the payoff functional being 
P(y, a) = min{t; (t, x(t)) EF} = t(x). (6.1) 
Player y tries to maximize t(x) (the capture time) whereas player z tries to 
minimize it. Thus z is the pursuer and y is the evader. 
As before, we define upper &games G8 with upper S-value I/” given by 
(2.1), (2.2) with P(y, z) == t(x). Similarly we define lower S-games G, with 
lower &value V, . Lemmas 1-3 remain unchanged. 
The only difference between the situation considered here and that 
considered in the previous sections is that the payoff t(x) is not necessarily a 
continuous functional. In general one can only assert that t(x) is lower semi- 
continuous. (The proof of the lower semi-continuity is rather trivial.) The 
proof of Theorem 1 therefore fails to carry through. 
What we shall do is extend the concept of Value and then prove that the 
game has “extended Value.” 
Assume that (i)-(iii) and (ix) hold. N o s eci p fi c restrictions are made on the 
payoff. Set 
where P,[r, d] is the set defined as in $5. In the definitions of (6.2), (6.3) it is 
understood that 
s”,p P,-[T, d] = sup sup CY, 
r aEPi[r,A] 
inf P,-[r, d] = inf inf /3. 
A A Witi-,A] 
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We call Vzz (Vi,) the extended upper value (extended I!OZWY value) at 2 of the 
differential game. Similarly we define the extended upper (lower) aalue L.,,, 
(V;,) at 7, where 9 E Y. If  l’,‘;,L = 5’~~ for all CY, /3 in Y u 2, then we say that 
the game has extended Value. The value of the extended Value is given by 
v, = VIE = v;, = c-z, =-: C’,, . (6.4) 
By Theorem 5, if (i)-(vi) and (ix) hold, then Ve exists and V, == V. 
We can now state: 
THEOREM 6. Let tlze conditions (i)-(iv) and (ix) hold. Then the dayerential 
game (I. I), (1.2), (6.1) has extended Value. 
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 8 of Varaiya- 
Lin [8]. 
Since Vk,* 3: I’;, for any 01 E Y u 2, it suffices to show that for any t > 0, 
and for any /3 E Y 6 2, 
V& < VT, $ E. (6.5) 
From the definition of V,& it follows that for any strategy r there is a strategy 
A such that 
t* :< v,, + E for some t* E P&[T, A]. (6.6) 
Thus, there exist sequences {P,}, {Oai} and the corresponding sequence of 
trajectories (x6$} such that 
where x(t) is a trajectory. Clearly 
Define a payoff pC by 
(x(P), t*) E F. (6.7) 
pJx) :-= min{I x(t) - 9 i + ( t - t^  j; (i, t^ ) EF, t, XC t 6. TJ (6.8) 
and consider the game over [t, , T,] determined by (1 .I), (1.2) and (6.8). 
Since pt is a uniformly continuous functional, Theorem 1 shows that this 
game has Value I;(pJ. 
We shall denote the payoff (6.8) also by P’(y, z). (6.7) shows that pE(x) = 0. 
Hence we have shown that for any strategy r there is a strategy d such that 
Pa’[r, A] contains the point 0. Theorem 5 then shows that V(pJ = 0. 
Furthermore, there exists a strategy A, such that 
P,c[T, A*] =m 0 forall I’andpEYuZ. (6.9) 
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Let a(t) be any outcome of r, d* with initial control 8. (6.9) implies that 
&x) = 0, i.e., (g(t), t) E F for some t < T, . Consequently, in the game with 
payoff (6. I>, 
p,[r, A*1 < T, . 
Hence 
Since T, = V,, + E, (6.5) follows. 
7. A GAME WHICH DOES NOT HAVE VALUE 
We shall show that the condition (iv) (see (1.5)) is essential for the assertion 
of Theorem 1. In fact, we shall show that the game given by 
&=4(y-x)2 (0 < t < l), (7.1) 
x(0) = 0, (7.2) 
P( y, .z) f p(x) = J: x(t) dt (7.3) 
where Y = {y;O <y < l}, 2 = {z; 0 < z < l}, does not have Value. This 
game was previously introduced by Berkovitz [I] as an example of a game 
which has no solution in pure strategies. 
Consider a game G, . Since z tries to minimize the payoff, x’s best strategy 
is to choose zj = yj in Ij . This results in zero payoff. Hence I’, = 0. 
Consider next a game G”. For each choice z = zj on Ij on Ij , y can choose 
yj such that / yi(t) - z,(t)1 3 4. Th e resulting trajectory x(t) satisfies 
dx/dt > 1. Thus x(t) 3 t, and the payoff is >, 4. Consequently V6 3 4. 
(Actually, equality holds.) 
We conclude that, for the differential game (7.1)-(7.3), V+ > v-, i.e., 
the game does not have Value. 
8. REMARKS ON THE WORKS OF VARAIYA-LIN AND FLEMING 
Varaiya and Lin [S] consider the differential systems % 
dx,- 
& -flk Xl ,YL %@) = x10 9 (8.1) 
2 =f2(& x2, 4, x2(0) = x20 9 (8.2) 
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with a payoff p(xl , x2). Instead of P they define maps 01~ from the space 
X,,, of trajectories of (8.2) into the space X1,, of trajectories of (8.1) such 
that if 
then 
x*(t) = %dt) for O:- t:;iST (8.3) 
(~“%M = (@%)(t) for O<t<GT. (8.4) 
Similarly they define ,P (analogously to As). 
Next, they define maps CY~ from Xz,T into X1,, such that if (8.3) holds then 
(8.4) holds for all 0 < t < (z’ t 1) 6T. Now they note that given a pair /3*, olg 
there is a unique pair x 1 , x2 of trajectories such that CQX~ = x1 , /Pxl = x2 . 
This is analogous to what happens in the scheme G6. 
The main results of [S] are the analogs of Theorems 1, 5 and 6 of the 
present paper for the systems (8.1), (8.2) and the payoff p(xl , xJ. 
Recently, Roxin [7] has suggested that in order to extend the work of 
Varaiya and Lin one should consider a?, ps, etc. as maps in the spaces of the 
control functions (rather than the spaces of the trajectories). 
Our approach in this paper is precisely that suggested by Roxin. However, 
we have replaced the maps, &, ,@, etc. by the maps P, As, etc. There is 
clearly an isomorphism between the two sets of notions, but we feel that our 
notions are more intuitive. The differential system that we consider, as well 
as the payoff, are of course more general than in [a]. Furthermore, unlike [a], 
we do not assume the convexity condition (ix) in proving that the game has 
Value. 
Fleming [3], [4], [.5] h as a different approach to the definition of a differential 
game (with a fixed time-interval). He discretizes the differential system (1 .l), 
replacing it by 
xi+l = xi -t &f(h , xi , yi , 3). 
This approximating game is played as a discrete game. The tools of probability 
then come naturally into play. Denoting the value of the nth approximating 
game by P’lz, he proves (in [5]), that lim V, exists, even without making the 
assumptions (1.5), (1.8). This limit he calls the Value of the game. This 
approach seems less related to the original system (1 .I), (1.2) than the 
approach we have adopted in this paper. 
9. DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH DELAYED INFORMATION 
In realistic situations it may occur that one or both of the players need some 
time to “digest” the up-to-date information concerning the development of 
the play. This motivates us to define the concept of a differential game with 
delay, and extend the results obtained in previous sections to this game. 
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We consider, for simplicity, only the case where y acts with some deIay u. 
We divide the interval (to, T) into 2’ subintervals Ii of equal length 
s (6 = (T - &)/2’), and assume, for simplicity, that the point T* = t, + u 
is an end-point of some interval Ij0. (Otherwise we introduce T’K as a new 
point of the partition.) Denote by Pj (1 < j < j,) any control function of y 
onIj. Forj>j,, Pj is any map from 2, X -1. X Zjej, into Yj . Similarly, 
denote by r,,j (1 <j < j, + 1) any control function of y on Ij . For 
j >j, + 1, r8,j is any map from 2, >< ..* >: Zjejoml into Yj . 
We now define upper and lower S-strategies for y by: 
rs = y,..., ry 
where n = 2’. The S-strategies As, Aa for z are defined exactly as in 92. 
It will be convenient to fix A,,,(t) SE xl(t) = E, rs,l(t) 3 yl(t) := 7. 
We define S-games G6 and G, as in $2, and then define the corresponding 
upper S-value V6 and the lower S-value V, by: 
V’ = sup inf P[A, , P], 
l-& As 
(9.1) 
V6 = i$sup qr,, AS]. 
rc? 
(9.2) 
The pair of sequences G(U) = ({G”}, (G,}) is called a differential game with 
o-delay for y. 
The definition (9.1) need not coincide with the definition (2.2) (for the 
present concept of S-strategies) since, in general (cf. (2.3)), 
inf sup Q(z), w) # sup inf Q(v, w). 
UEV WEW mew YEV 
However, using (2.2), (2.3) we find that the definition of VO given by (9.2) 
coincides with that given by (2.7). Moreover (cf. Lemma 2), 
V, = sup in; P[Y, , A*]. 
rs 
(9.3) 
The set of all the maps d,,j can be identified with a subset of the set of all 
maps &j. Similarly, if j > j0 then the set of all maps r,,i can be identified 
with a subset of the set of all maps Pj. If j < j,, , then the set of all the 
functions P’ and the set of all the functions r,,j both coincide with Yj . 
Using these remarks, it follows from (9.1), (9.3) that 
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From (2.7) we also get 
Vs, b Vs, if 6, < 6, . (9.5) 
From (9.5) it follows that lim,,, V, exists. 
THEOREM 7. Let the assumptions (i)-(vi) hold. Then lim,,, Vs exists and 
(9.6) 
The common limit in (9.6) is called the Value of the differential game with 
u-delay for y. We denote it by I,‘(o). 
In view of (9.4) and (9.5), the assertion (9.6) follows from the following 
assertion: Any subsequence {S,} of (6) h as a subsequence {S,,} such that, for 
any 6 > 0, 
V6 < V, + E if 6 = S,, ,j’ > j* (9.7) 
where j* is sufficiently large. 
The proof of (9.7) is similar to the proof of (3.2), and is therefore omitted. 
One can prove results similar to Theorems 22.5 for the present differential 
game with y-delay u. 
The next question is whether V(a) ---f V as o - 0. The answer is given in 
the following theorem. 
THEOREM 8. Let the assumptions (i)-(vi) hold. Then 
‘;a V(u) = v. (9.8) ?a 
Proof. It is clear that V(U) < V. Hence it suffices to show that 
v  < lo% V(u). (9.9) 
Choose 0” such that 
V(a) 2 P[r, , B] - 6 for any r 8, (9.10) 
where r, is a lower S-strategy for the a-game with u-delay for y. Next choose 
an upper a-strategy p6 for the a-game associated with (1.1), (1.2), (1.7) such 
that 
P[As ) F] 3 v  + 6 for any A,. (9.11) 
Consider the a-strategy f, obtained from pa by imposing a (u + S)-delay, 
I.e., 
P~6.k+j,(Z1 )...) X&J = (P*“(z1 )...) &))(t + 6 + u). (9.12) 
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From (9.10) we get 
v-(a) 2 P[f* ) B] - s. (9.13) 
Denote by Z(t) the z-control obtained from the pair (p&, A6). Let 8, be 
a lower S-strategy for z such that the z-control corresponding to the pair 
(A ,^ , p*) is Z(t). By (9.1 I), 
P[B, ) fq $ v  -f 6. (9.14) 
Observe now, by (9.12), that the y-controls -q(t) and Y(t) corresponding to 
(pa , 0”) and to (8, , I’“) satisfy 
s(t) = $t + S + 0) if t,<t<T-S-u; 
the z-controls are the same. Applying Lemma 4 we conclude that for any 
sequences (S,>, {oj] converging to zero there exist subsequences {S,,}, {nj,} 
such that 
1 P[d8 , P] - P[P8 , ii811 - 0 as s = sj, ---f 0, 0 = Oj’ - 0. (9.15) 
Combining (9.15) with (9.13), (9.14), we get (9.9). This completes the 
proof of Theorem 8. 
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